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AFFIRMATIVE REFRACTION:
GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER THROUGH THE
LENS OF THE CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN
EXPLORERS*
PaulL. Caron**
Rafael Gely***
What can a fifty year-old hypothetical about human cannibalism concocted by the late Lon Fuller' teach us about the Supreme
Court's recent foray into the affirmative action debate in twentyfirst century America?2 Indeed, what can a tax law professor and a
labor law professor add to the cacophony of voices of leading constitutional law scholars on the Court's most important pronouncement on race in a generation? 3 We make a rather modest
claim, based on teaching both of these cases in our one-week Introduction to Law classes for incoming first year students, 4 that a
helpful way to view Grutter v. Bollinger is through the lens of The
* © 2004, Paul L. Caron and Rafael Gcly. We want to thank Chris Bryant,
Charles Craver, Lonny Hoffman, Stewart Schwab, Peggie Smith, Michael Solimine, and
Joe Tomain for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Special thanks to
Travis Lcnkncr.
** Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Projects, University
of Cincinnati College of Law.
*** Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law.
I. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
2. This Article focuses on the case involving the usc of race in law school admissions policies at the University of Michigan, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2(X)3),
and not the companion case involving the usc of race in undergraduate admissions policies at Michigan, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
3. We come to this task not entirely unequipped: one of us has recently taken an
unorthodox tack in writing about a legal issue of great public interest, Paul L. Caron, The
Federal Tax Implications of Bush v. Gore, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 749 (2001), while the other
has plumbed some of the jurisprudential underpinnings of this Article, Rafael Gcly &
Leonard Bierman, Labor Law Access Rules and Stare Decisis: Developing A PlannedParenthood-Based Model of Reform, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 138 (1999); Rafael
Gcly, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITI. L.
REV. 89 (1998). See also Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gcly, What Law Schools Can Learn
from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1483 (2004).
4. The course is designed to equip incoming students with the analytical tools and
framework needed for success in the first year of law school. See www.law.uc.edu/courses.
5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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Case of the Speluncean Explorers. 6 Legal scholars have issued
dozens of new "opinions" on the hypothetical legal issue in that
case to take into account contemporary legal theories developed
7
in the past fifty-five years. This Article is the first to take the op8
posite approach and view a real-life legal issue through the eyes
of the fictional Justices in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers.
This Article also is the first to consider the applicability of Fuller's
hypothetical outside the context of statutory construction.
We argue that the various opinions in Grutter find their intellectual forebears in the opinions in The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers. For all the heat generated by Grutter, the opinions
merely mark another way station in the centuries-old debate
among competing philosophies of the role of law and government. By examining the Grutter opinions in the context of this
rich jurisprudential tradition, we hope to elevate much of the
current debate about the case, in which labels like "liberal" and
"conservative" are hurled about like epithets, toward a more sophisticated understanding of how the various Justices' approaches embody alternative views of the proper judicial function in our democracy.
Parts I and II of this Article describe the facts and opinions
in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers and Grutter. Part III
then draws some rather surprising connections between these
very different cases by using what we call a "jurisprudence of
humility." We explain how the disparate opinions in Grutter can
be understood in the context of the issues addressed by the
mythical justices in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers over
half a century ago. Although a jurisprudence of humility does
not make it any easier to decide difficult issues like the constitu6. Fuller noted that his hypothetical could be used to "bring[] into common focus
certain divergent philosophies of law and government." Fuller, supra note 1, at 645.
7. See PETER SUBER, TilE CASE OF TilE SI'ELUNCEAN EXPLORERS: NINE NEW
OPINIONS (1998); Anthony D'Amato, The Speluneean Explorers-Further Opinions, 32
STAN. L. REv. 467 (1980) (three new opinions); Symposium, The Case of the Spelunccan
Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834-1923 (1999) (six
new opinions) [hereinafter Harvard Spcluncean Symposium]; Symposium, 61 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1731-1811 (1993) (seven new opinions) [hereinafter George Washington
Spelunccan Symposium].
8. Cf J.B. Ruhl, The Case of the Speluncean Polluters: Six Themes of Environmental Law, Policy, and Ethics, 27 ENYTL. L. 343 (1997) (using The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, with seven opinions by different hypothetical judges deciding hypothetical legal issue in a futuristic mythical jurisdiction, to explore contrasting
jurisprudential theories of environmental law); Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Newgarth Re~·isited: Mrs. Robii!Son's Case, 49 S.C. L. REV. 407 (1998) (using The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, with five opinions by different hypothetical judges, to decide a hypothetical case involving the title character in Paul Simon's song Mrs. Robinson).
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tionality of racial classifications in university admissions or the
applicability of a murder statute to stranded cave explorers who
kill and eat a colleague, this framework illuminates how different
theories of the proper role of courts affect the decisions made by
judges. A better appreciation of these theories, in turn, will help
inform lawyers who practice before those judges and law professors who write about them.
I. THE CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS

In the faraway year of 4299 in the mythical jurisdiction of
Newgarth,9 five members of an amateur society of caveexplorers (the Speluncean Society) are trapped after a landslide
covers the opening of a cave they are exploring. 10 A frantic rescue effort is launched, 11 but the explorers' provisions will be depleted before the rescuers can reach them. On the twentieth day
of the ordeal, rescuers make radio contact and tell the explorers
that it will take at least ten days to free them. Medical experts
inform the explorers that there is "little possibility" they will
survive the ten days without food. When asked by Richard
Whetmore, one of the explorers, the experts report that four of
them could survive if they kill and eat the flesh of the fifth member of the group. When Whetmore asks whether they should
draw lots to pick the explorer to be killed and eaten, the medical
experts refuse to answer, and Whetmore's requests for guidance
from judges, government officials, and clergy go unheeded.
Three days later, Whetmore is killed and eaten by the other four
explorers after they draw lots by throwing dice. 12
9. Fuller chose this year because "the centuries which separate us [in 1949] from
the year 4300 [the year of the Newgarth Supreme Court's decision in the case] arc
roughly equal to those that have passed since the Age of Pericles." Fuller, supra note 1,
at 645 (Truepenny, C.J.).
10. The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is drawn from two famous old cases: Re·
gina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (after twenty days at sea on a lifeboat,
defendants kill and cat youngest person on boat; defendants convicted of murder but
death sentences commuted); and United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa.
1842) (defendant crew member of ship that sank threw several passengers out of life
boat; defendant convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six months' imprisonment).
II. The rescue was difficult because of the cave's location in a remote and isolated
region. The rescue work was slowed by several new landslides, one of which killed ten of
the rescuers. Fuller, supra note 1, at 616.
12. Although Whctmore first raised the prospect of cannibalism and proposed
choosing the unlucky person by drawing lots, he later changed his mind and preferred to
wait another week "before embracing an expedient so frightful and odious." !d. at 618.
The other explorers considered this a breach of faith on Whctmore's part and proceeded
to cast the dice. One of them threw the dice on behalf of Whetmore, who stated that he
did not object to the fairness of the throw. !d.
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After the four survivors are rescued nine days later, they are
indicted and tried for murder under a statute providing in its entirety: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be
punishable by death." 13 The jury issues a special verdict finding
the facts as outlined above, and the trial judge finds the defendants guilty under the statute and imposes a mandatory death
sentence. 14 The jury and trial judge join in requesting the Chief
Executive of Newgarth to commute the defendants' sentences to
six months' imprisonment. 15 Defendants appeal to the fivemember Supreme Court of Newgarth while the clemency request is pending.
A. JUSTICES VOTING TO AFFIRM THE CONVICTIONS

1. Chief Justice Truepenny
Chief Justice Truepenny votes to uphold the verdict because
the statute "permits of no exception applicable to this case, however our sympathies may incline us to make allowance for the
tragic situation in which these men found themselves." 16 But the
Chief Justice also urges the Court to join in the clemency petition
to the Chief Executive. 17 In this way, "justice will be accomplished
without impairing either the letter or spirit of our statutes and
without offering any encouragement for the disregard of law." 18
2. Justice Keen
Justice Keen provides the second vote to affirm the convictions. At the outset of his opinion, Justice Keen quickly disposes
of two issues that he says are not the province of the Court:
(1) executive clemency 19 and (2) morality- "whether what these
men did was 'right' or 'wrong.'" Instead, the sole issue is one of
statutory construction, and Justice Keen concludes that "any
candid observer, content to extract from these words their natu13.
14.

/d. at 619.

15.

/d.

A death sentence is mandatory in Ncwgarth for the crime of murder. /d.

16. /d. at 619 (Truepenny, C.J.).
17. Chid Justice Trucpenny notes that there is "every reason to believe" that the
clemency requests will be heeded by the Chief Executive. /d.
18.

/d.

19. Although Justice Keen rejects the call for executive clemency, he notes that if
he were the Chief Executive rather than a Supreme Court Justice, he would go further
than the six-months' imprisonment sought in the clemency petition and instead "pardon
these men altogether, since I believe that they have already suffered enough to pay for
any offense they may have committed." /d. at 632 (Keen, J.).

AFFIRMATIVE REFRACTION

2004]

67

ral meaning, would concede at once that these defendants did
'willfully take the life' of Roger Whetmore." 20 Justice Keen chastises his colleagues for their "failure to distinguish the legal from
the moral aspects of this case." 21 He "bluntly" accuses his fellow
Justices of subordinating "the law of the land" to their own
"conceptions of morality." 22
Justice Keen recounts the civil war fought in Newgarth centuries earlier as a result of "an unseemly struggle for power" between the judicial branch and the legislative and executive
branches, which established the supremacy of the legislature. 23
He, like Justice Tatting, sharply criticizes Justice Foster for disregarding the clear language of the statute in order to further its
purported purpose of deterrence. According to Justice Keen, the
statute at issue here, like most if not all statutes, has multiple
purposes. It is thus, a canard to argue that courts may fill in the
gap in the statute or make corrections in the legislative design.
Instead, the Court's role is to interpret the statute "in accordance with its plain meaning without reference to our personal
desires or our individual conceptions of justice. " 24
Justice Keen also takes issue with Justice Foster and Justice
Tatting's reliance on an exception to the murder statute, created
by an earlier decision of the Court on the theory that a defendant who acts in self-defense does not act "willfully." Justice
Keen contends that the exception is not relevant here because it
applies only when the defendant resists a threat to his own life,
and "Whetmore made no threat against the lives of these defendants."25 Justice Keen concludes that his approach provides the
best result in this case and leads to the sounder administration of
justice in the long run. "[W]e would have inherited a better legal
system from our forefathers if [these] principles had been observed from the beginning. For example, with respect to the excuse of self-defense, if our courts had stood steadfast on the language of the statute the result would undoubtedly have been a
legislative revision of it. " 26

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 632.
at 633.
at 636.
at 637.
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B. JUSTICES VOTING TO REVERSE THE CONVICTIONS

1. Justice Foster

Justice Foster first criticizes Chief Justice Truepenny's exhortation to seek clemency as "an expedient at once so sordid
and so obvious":
I believe something more is on trial in this case than the fate
of these unfortunate explorers; that is the law of our Commonwealth. If this Court declares that under our law these
men have committed a crime, then our law is itself convicted
in the tribunal of common sense .... For us to assert that the
law we uphold and expound compels us to a conclusion we
are ashamed of, and from which we can only escape by appealing to a dispensation resting within the personal whim of
the Executive, seems to me to amount to an admission that
the law of this Commonwealth no longer pretends to incorpo.
•
27
rate Just1ce.

Justice Foster then offers two independent justifications in
support of his view that the law does not compel "the monstrous
conclusion that these men are murderers. " 2 First, the statute
and related case law do not apply because the explorers' horrendous circumstances placed them in a "state of nature," and the
explorers thus were subject only to natural law. Under the natural law precept of freedom of contract, the explorers' compact
was justifiable to enable the four to survive at the cost of the
one. 9 Second, the statute must be interpreted in light of its purpose of deterring murder, and this purpose is not served in convicting the defendants because they were justified in taking
Whetmore's life to ensure their own survival. 3
Although Justice Foster professes fealty to the principle that
the Court is bound by statutes and is thus subservient to the duly
expressed will of the legislature, he distinguishes "intelligent"
from "unintelligent" obedience. 31 Justice Foster emphasizes that
"[n]o superior wants a servant who lacks the capacity to read between the lines." 32 Justice Foster offers two examples: "The stupidest housemaid knows that when she is told 'to peel the soup

27.

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

at 620.
at 620-23.
at 624-25.
at 625.
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and skim the potatoes' her mistress does not mean what she says.
She also knows that when her master tells her to 'drop everything and come running' he has overlooked the possibility that
she is at the moment in the act of rescuing the baby from the rain
barrel. Surely we have a right to expect the same modicum of intelligence from the judiciary. " 33 He thus concludes that the "correction of obvious legislative errors or oversights is not to supplant the legislative will, but to make that will effective." 34
2. Justice Handy
Justice Handy takes a pragmatic, common-sense approach
in providing the second vote to reverse the convictions. Justice
Handy notes that he has become "more and more perplexed at
men's refusal to agply their common sense to problems of law
and government." The question on appeal, he writes, is one of
"practical wisdom, to be exercised in a context, not of abstract
theory, but of realities." 36 He chides his colleagues for throwing
"an obscuring curtain of legalisms" at what is at bottom a simple
case. For example, he criticizes the "learned disquisitions on the
distinction between positive law and the law of nature, the language of the statute and the purpose of the statute, judicial functions and executive functions, judicial legislation and legislative
legislation. " 37 Justice Handy reminds his colleagues of the danger of getting "lost in the patterns of our thought and forget that
these patterns often cast not the slightest shadow on the outside
world." 38 In Justice Handy's view, courts derive their legitimacy
by bending to popular will, and the Court here should follow the
poll reporting that 90 percent of the public believes that the defendants should be pardoned or given a token punishment. Justice Handy latches onto Justice Foster's statutorr. purpose argument to provide the legal rationale for this result. 9
Justice Handy concludes his opinion with two lessons drawn
from his personal experience. First, he dismisses the possibility
of clemency based on gossip from his wife's niece, who is a

33. !d. at 625-26.
34. !d. at 626; see also id. at624 ("[A] man may break the letter of the law without
breaking the law itself.").
35. !d. at 643.
36. !d. at 637-38 (Handy, 1.).
37. !d. at637.
38. !d. at 642.
39. !d. at 640.
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friend of the Chief Executive's secretary. 40 According to Justice
Handy, he shared this information with his colleagues. This explained Chief Justice Truepenny's "flap[ping) his judicial robes"
to encourage the Chief Executive to grant clemency, "[Justice)
Foster's feat of levitation by which a whole library of law books
was lifted from the shoulders of these defendants," and "[Justice] Keen emulat[ing) Pooh-Bah in the ancient comedy by stepping to the other side of the stage to address a few remarks to
the Executive 'in my capacity as a private citizen. "' 41 Second,
Justice Handy compares this case to the first case he heard as a
trial judge, in which he was "widely approved by the press and
public opinion" for employing his common sense and avoiding
the many "perplexing" legal issues raised in the case. 42
C. THE DECIDING VOTE: JUSTICE TATTING
With the Court deadlocked, the deciding vote falls to Justice
Tatting. His initial opinion is written after the first opinions to
affirm (Chief Justice Truepenny) and reverse (Justice Foster).
He finds himself "torn between sympathy for [the defendants)
and a feeling of abhorrence and disgust at the monstrous act
they committed. " 43 He had hoped to be able to "put these contradictory emotions to one side as irrelevant, and to decide the
case on the basis of a convincing and logical demonstration of
the result demanded by our law." 44 But he is not convinced by
the arguments on either side.
Justice Tatting rejects both of Justice Foster's rationales for
reversing the convictions. The question of the boundary of a
state of nature is intractable, and in any event Justice Tatting is
unpersuaded that the law applicable in such a state should permit the law of contracts to override the law of murder. 45 The
purposive analysis is unavailing where, as here, there are several
purposes served by the criminal statute (retribution and rehabilitation in addition to deterrence ). 46 Moreover, the self-defense
rationale is flawed because the defendants here acted willfully
and deliberately in planning and executing Whetmore's killing.
Justice Tatting invokes the case of Jean Claude Valjean of Les
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 642.
at 642-43.
at 643-44.
at 626 (Tatting, J.).

at 627-28.
!d. at 628-29.
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Miserables in arguing that impending starvation neither excuses
Valjean's stealing of a loaf of bread nor the defendants' killing of
Whetmore. 47 Justice Tatting envisions "a quagmire of hidden difficulties" if the self-defense exception is applied. 48 Justice Tatting
ultimately rejects Justice Foster's arguments in favor of reversal
49
as intellectually unsound and approaching mere rationalization.
Yet Justice Tatting also is repelled at the prospect of affirming the convictions. He complains: "[T]he more I examine this
case and think about it, .... [m]y mind becomes entangled in the
meshes of the very nets I throw out for my own rescue. I find that
almost every consideration that bears on the decision of the case
is counterbalanced by an opposing consideration leading in the
opposite direction. "50 After expressing regret that the prosecutor
did not simply refuse to indict the defendants, Justice Tatting
takes the "unprecedented" step of withdrawing from the case. 5 1
After the second opinions to affirm (Justice Keen) and reverse (Justice Handy) are proffered, Chief Justice True penny
asks Justice Tatting to reconsider. Justice Tatting declines:
"[A]fter hearing these opinions I am greatly strengthened in my
conviction that I ought not to participate in the decision of this
case. " 52 As a result, the Court is evenly divided, the convictions
are affirmed, and the executions are set for April 2, 4300. 53

II. GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER
In the not-so-distant year of 1992 in the non-mythical state
of Michigan, the dean of the University of Michigan Law School
charged a faculty committee with crafting a written admissions
policy to implement the goals of attracting "a mix of students
with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and
learn from each other" 54 while complying with the Supreme
Court's Bakke decision. 55 The policy developed by the committee, and later unanimously approved by the Law School faculty,
combined an assessment of academic ability "with a flexible as47. /d. at 629-30.
48. /d. at 630.
49. /d. at 631.
50. /d. ("My brother Foster has not furnished to me, nor can I discover for myself,
any formula capable of resolving the equivocations that beset me on all sides.").
51. /d.
52. /d. at 644.
53. /d. at 645.
54. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314 (2003).
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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sess~ent of applicants_' talents, experiences, and Rotential 'to
contnbute to the learnmg of those around them."' 6 The policy
directed admissions officials to consider, as predictors of academic success, the applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score.
Admissions officials, however, also were directed to "look beyond grades and test scores" to other criteria that the Law
School deemed important. 57 These so-called "soft" variables included "the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the undergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, and
the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection." 58
To meet its goals of achieving "that diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school
class stronger than the sum of its parts," 59 the policy did not restrict
the type of diversity contributions that could be considered by the
admissions officers. However, the admissions policy reaffirmed the
Law School's commitment to "racial and ethnic diversity." 60 In particular, the Law School sought to enroll a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority applicants, "who without the Law School's
commitment might not be represented in [the] student body in
meaningful numbers. " 61 The underrepresented grougs included African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native-Americans.
In 1996, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a
3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, applied and was denied admission
to the Law School. 63 Grutter filed suit in federal district court,
alleging that the Law School discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by using
race as a predominant factor in admissions. The U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found in favor of
Grutter, concluding that the Law School's use of race was unlawful.64 The district court held that the Law School's interest in assembling a racially diverse class was not a compelling state interest and that the Law School had not "narrowly tailored its use of
race to further that interest." 65 The U.S. Court of Appeals for

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

539 U.S. at 315.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d. at 316.
!d.
!d.
!d.
137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 20<Jl).
!d. at 872.
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the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed in a contentious 5-4
vote on both grounds, holding that diversity constituted a compelling state interest under Bakke and that the Law School's policy was narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest be66
cause race was only used as a "potential 'plus' factor. " The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "a question of national importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest
that can justify the narrowly-tailored use of race in selecting ap67
plicants for admission to public universities."
A. JUSTICES VOTING TO UPHOLD THE
LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS POLICY

1. Justice O'Connor68

Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, holding that
the Law School's admissions policy satisfied strict scrutiny by advancing a compelling state interest in using race as one of the factors to be considered in the admission process and by demonstrating that the use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve this
compelling interest. She began by reviewing the Bakke decision,
in which only Justice Powell believed that the attainment of a diverse student body could be a compelling interest. Substantial
confusion existed in the lower courts on whether a rationale set
forth in an opinion not joined by any other Justice constituted
"binding precedent." 69 Justice O'Connor did not need to resolve
this question because the Court was ready to "endorse Justice
Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state interest which can justify the use of race in university admissions." 70
Justice O'Connor then turned to the doctrinal test to be
used in evaluating the Law School's admissions policy: racial
classifications only may be used "for the most compelling reason," and only if they are narrowly tailored to further those rea66. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en bane).
67. 539 u.s. 306,322 (2002).
68. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the majority opinion.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined only with respect to two
points: (1) that unequal treatment among underrepresented minority groups is unconstitutional; and (2) that in 25 years, the practices upheld by the majority will be illegal. !d. at
344-45 (Thomas & Scalia, 11., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
69. !d. at 321. In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the Court held that
"[w]hcn a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds."
70. 539 U.S. at 325.
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sons. 71 The use of "strict scrutiny" when the government employs racial classifications is necessary, according to Justice
O'Connor, to '"smoke out' illegitimate uses of race." 72 Justice
O'Connor softened this stern description of strict scrutiny with
two caveats. First, " [s)trict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' 73 Second, the context in which a racial classification
is used matters in evaluating the governmental action. She
pointed out that "not every decision influenced by race is equally
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a framework for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of
the reasons advanced by the government decisionmaker for the
use of race in that particular context." 74
Justice O'Connor defined the purported compelling interest
advanced by the Law School and set the stage for application of
the strict scrutiny analysis. The Law School advanced "only one
justification for their [sic) use of race in the admission process:
obtaining 'the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body."' 75 Justice O'Connor again cast the case in a light favorable to the Law School by making two additional qualifications. First, none of the affirmative action cases decided by the
Court in the 25 years since Bakke "either expressly or implicitly"
foreclosed the Law School's argument. 76 Second, given that
"universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradition," and in keeping with the Court's practice in disputes involving complex educational judgments, the Court would grant a
wide berth to the Law School's decisions. 77
Justice O'Connor described the educational benefits that
"diversity is designed to produce." 78 After a brief reference to
the trial court's findings that "the Law School's admissions policy promotes 'cross racial understanding,' helps to break down
racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand
persons of different races,"' 79 she relied exclusively on statements from amicus briefs to support the conclusion that the Law
School had a compelling interest in utilizing race in its admisstons decisions. Representing the educational community, the
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at 326.
(quoting Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)).
at 327.
at 328.
at 330.
at 330.
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American Educational Research Association noted that "diversity promotes leaning outcomes, and better preRares students for
an increasingly diverse workforce and society." 8°From the business community, General Motors asserted that diversity is necessary to develop the skills needed b~ workers to complete in an
"increasingly global marketplace." 1 The U.S. military added
that "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide national security. "82 If the military needs affirmative action
to fulfill its mission, "it requires only a small step from this
analysis to conclude that our country's most selective institutions
must remain both diverse and selective." 83 Finally, the Association of American Law Schools wrote that diversity in law schools
is essential to cultivating leaders who are seen by the citizenry as
legitimate, because a large proportion of elected political offices
in the country are occupied by individuals with law degrees. 84
Justice O'Connor then discussed the narrow tailoring prong
of the strict scrutiny test. Again giving deference to the Law
School's educational judgment, she found that the flexible use of
race in admissions decisions satisfied this prong. 85 The Law
School's admissions policy was "highly individualized," involving
a "holistic review of each applicant's file" and giving "serious
consideration" to the multiple ways in which an applicant's
background might contribute to a diverse educational environ80. /d.
81. /d.
82. /d. at 331.
83. /d.
84. /d. at 332. Among the dozens of amicus briefs submitted in support of the University of Michigan were those from the American Association for Higher Education,
American Civil Liberties Union, American Council on Education, American Educational Research Association, American Law Deans Association, American Sociological
Association, Association of American Colleges and Universities, Association of American Law Schools, Association of American Medical Colleges, Clinical Legal Education
Association, Coalition of Bar Associations of Color, Coalition for Economic Equality,
Committee of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools, Executive
Leadership Council, Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists, Graduate
Management Admission Council, Hispanic National Bar Association, Law School Admission Council, The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Minority Business Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Center for Fair and Open
testing, National Partnership for Women and Families, National Women's Law Center,
Society of American Law Teachers, and Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement, as well as various law school deans, law schools, law student groups, state bar associations, law school alumni associations, and associations of minority lawyers.
85. "(A]n admissions program must be 'flexible enough to consider all pertinent
clements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to
place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according to
the same weight."' /d. at 334 (quoting Bakke).
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86

ment. Justice O'Connor dismissed the argument that the Law
School's policy was not narrowly tailored because race-neutral
means exist to achieve the educational benefits derived from a
diverse student body. 87 Justice O'Connor considered but ultimately rejected a lottery system88 and Florida and Texas's "percentage" plans 89 as unworkable in the graduate/professional
school context.
Justice O'Connor concluded that "race conscious admissions policies must be limited in time." 90 Because of the inherent
risk that racial classifications will be used more broadly than
needed to accomplish compelling goals, they should have "a
logical end point. "91 Justice O'Connor established the "logical
end point" at 25 years. Given that "the number of minority applicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased"
during the 25 years that have passed since Bakke, Justice
O'Connor anticipated that "25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today." 92
2. Justice Ginsburg
In a short concurrence joined by Justice Breyer, Justice
Ginsburg focused primarily on Justice O'Connor's 25-year sunset. Justice Ginsburg agreed that a sunset is appropriate, citing as
support international law documents addressing the elimination
of racial discrimination. 93 She challenged the notion, however,
that enough progress has been made on racial issues in the
United States in the 25 years since Bakke to be able to "firmly
forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress toward

86. /d. at 337.
87. /d. at 339.
88. Justice O'Connor argued that a lottery system would not allow the school to
achieve other educational values, such as selectivity. /d. at 339-40.
89. These "percentage plans" guarantee undergraduate admission at state universities to all students above a certain class rank in every high school in the state. /d. at 340.
90. /d. at 342.
91. !d.
92. /d. at 343.
93. /d. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg refers to the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Annex to G.A.
Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. N6014, Art. 2(2) (1965),
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (no. 46) 194, U.N. Doc. N34/46,
Art. 4(1) (1979).
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nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it
safe to sunset affirmative action. " 94
B. JUSTICES VOTING TO REJECT THE
LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS POLICY

1. Justice Scalia

95

Justice Scalia concurred in only two aspects of the majority's holding, 96 and the remainder of his short opinion took the
majority to task on several points. He noted that the majority
failed to address the central arguments raised in dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia then concentrated his fire on the likely effects of the majority's decision.
Justice Scalia first addressed the relevance of the majority's
ruling for future cases. He restated the educational benefit the
Law School sought as including "cross-racial understanding,"
and a "better prepar[ ation ofJ students for an increasingly diverse workforce and society." 9 But this benefit is not "uniquely
relevant" to the Law School, or "uniquely 'teachable' in a formal
educational setting." 98 Accordingly, this interest cannot be limited to the University of Michigan Law School but instead arguably is appropriate for other public institutions, such as Michigan's civil service system, and for private employers who seek to
"'teach' good citizenship to their adult employees through a patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in hiring. " 99
Troubled by this possibility, Justice Scalia sneered that "[t)he
nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, a
civil service job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will
surely understand." 100
Justice Scalia then accused the majority of prolonging litigation in this area. He listed a number of issues in which further
litigation is likely to be sparked by what he characterizes as the
"Grutter-Gratz split double header. " 101 Such future litigation
likely will arise in resolving whether there has been enough
evaluation of a candidate as an individual, in determining
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion. !d. at 344.
See supra note 68.
Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
!d.
!d. at 348.
!d.
!d.
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whether a university has exceeded the bounds of a "good faith
effort," and in assessing the educational benefits flowing from
racial diversity. 102
2. Justice Thomas 103
Justice Thomas also concurred with only two aspects of the
majority's holding 104 and rebuked the majority on several points.
Justice Thomas's opinion developed two themes: doctrinal and
personal.
The doctrinal discussion focused on strict scrutiny jurisprudence and its application to this case. In the past, the Court rejected as a compelling state interest the use of racial classifications
to provide minority teachers as role models, 105 to remedy general
societal discrimination, 106 and to further the best interests of children in custody disputes. 107 According to Justice Thomas, these
prior cases mandated a very limited definition of a compelling
state interest: "only those measures the State must take to provide
a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence." 108 Justice
Thomas argued that the interest the Law School sought to advance- "to obtain 'educational benefits that flow from student
body diversity,"' 109 -is no more than an interest in improving
"marginally the education it offers without sacrificing too much of
its exclusivity and elite status." 110 Unlike the other dissenting
opinions, which focused primarily on a few aspects of the majority's opinion, Justice Thomas launched a frontal assault on the
majority opinion's development of the compelling interest and the
narrow tailoring prongs of the strict scrutiny test.
As to the compelling interest prong, Justice Thomas argued
that the state has no "pressing public necessity" in maintaining a
public law school or in the marginal improvements in legal education that arguably derive from using racial classifications in the
admissions process. 111 In support of this conclusion, he argued that
the Law School's purported compelling interest does little "to ad-

102.
103.
I 04.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
II 0.
Ill.

!d.
Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's opinion. !d. at 349.
See mpra note 68.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed .. 476 U.S. 267,275-76 (1986).
Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984).
Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 353.
!d. at 354.
!d. at 355-56.
/d. at 356-57.
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vance the welfare of the people of Michigan or any cognizable interest of the State of Michigan." 112 Because the Law School
"trains few Michigan residents and overwhelmingly serves students, who, as lawyers, leave the State of Michigan," the Law
School failed to identify any sufficiently compelling interest. 113 As
to the narrow tailoring prong, Justice Thomas criticized the majority for selectively relying on social science evidence and for deferring to the Law School's use of racial classifications to solve a
problem that the Law School itself created.
The second, more personal theme of Justice Thomas's opinion is reflected in a quotation from an 1865 speech by Frederick
Douglass, which argued that African-Americans and other nonwhites do not need the government's help. "Like Douglass, I believe blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life without the meddling of university administrators. " 114 Justice Thomas asserted that the majority failed to advance any evidence
showing that the Law School's policy benefits students admitted
as a result of it. There is no evidence these students "prove
themselves by performing at (or even near) the same level as
those students who receive no preferences." 115 The majority also
offered no social science research disproving the notion that affirmative action "engender[s] attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they
have been wronged by the government's use of race." 116 Ultimately, he argued, the race-conscious policy stigmatizes as undeserving all minority students admitted to the Law School. 117
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist 118

Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for "an unprecedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny analysis."119 In particular, the Chie~ Justice focused on the "critical
mass" concept: "stripped of its 'critical mass' veil, the Law
School's pro~ram is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial
balancing." 12
112. /d. at 360.
113. /d.
114. /d. at350.
115. /d. at 371.
116. /d. at 373.
117. /d.
118. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rchnquist's dissenting opinion. /d. at 378.
119. /d. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J.. dissenting).
120. /d. at 379.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority's application of the strict scrutiny test was contrary to the Court's precedents. The majority applied a more lenient review than that required under strict scrutiny. Neither the fact that the Law School
uses racial classifications in "good faith" nor the fact that the defendant is an institution of higher education justified the majority's lax approach. 121
In disputing the "critical mass" concept, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that the Law School failed to explain why the
numbers of individuals who constitute a "critical mass" vary
from minority group to minority group. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, "the Law School's admissions practices with respect to [underrepresented minority groups] differ dramatically
and cannot be defended under any consistent use of the term
'critical mass."' 122 He pointed out that the number of students
who constitute a critical mass was larger for African-Americans
than for other underrepresented minorities. For example, from
1995-2000, the Law School admitted 13-19 Native-Americans,
91-108 African-Americans, and 47-56 Hispanics. 123
The Chief Justice also challenged the majority's assertion
that the Law School did not try to ensure admission to "some
specified percentage" of a minority group because of its race. He
argued that "the correlation between the percentage of the Law
School's pool of applicants who are members of the three minority groups and the percentage of the admitted applicants who are
members of these same groups is far too precise to be dismissed
as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to
numbers."' 124 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Law
School offered admission to members of underrepresented minority groups in proportion to their statistical representation in
the applicant pool, a "patently un.constitutional" practice. 125
4. Justice Kennedy
Like the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy also faulted the majority for failing to apply the strict scrutiny test as developed in
prior cases. Although Justice Kennedy agreed in principle with
Justice Powell's view in Bakke that racial diversity among stu121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

/d. at 379-80.
/d.at381.
/d.
/d. at 383.
/d.
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dents could be a compelling interest, the Law School failed to
make that showing in this case. 126
Justice Kennedy argued that the critical mass concept is inconsistent with the principle that applicants must be given individual consideration in the admissions process. Eighty to eightyfive percent of the spaces in the entering class are given to applicants in the upper range of the quantitative criteria (GPA and
LSAT scores). "[T]he competition becomes tight" in the remaining 15 to 20 percent, where "race is likely outcome determinative
for many members of minority groups." 127 Justice Kennedy argued that individual consideration of an applicant's file, which
according to the majority is critical in finding that the program is
constitutional, did not take place within the Law School's program. Like the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy found troubling
the "narrow fluctuation band" in the percentage of enrolled minority students at the Law School. 128 Justice Kennedy was particularly disturbed by the fact that admissions officers at the Law
School consulted the daily reports indicating the racial composition of the incoming class. 129
Justice Kennedy concluded by lamenting the most serious
consequence of the Court's ruling: relieving university administrators from their obligation to devise "new and fairer ways to
ensure individual consideration" 130 and reducing the incentives
that now exist "to make the existing minority admissions
schemes transparent and protective of individual review." 131
This, in turn, would "perpetuate the hostilities that proper consideration of race is designed to avoid." 132
III. AFFIRMATIVE REFRACTION: THE CASE
FOR A JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMILITY
At one level, of course, these two cases could not be more
different. In The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, the court below imposed murder convictions and death sentences on four
explorers who killed and ate a colleague in order to survive after
they were trapped by a landslide in a cave. In Grutter, the Sixth

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

/d. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
/d. at 389.
/d. at 390.
!d. at 391.
/d. at 393.
/d. at 394.
/d.
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Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge by a white applicant
denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Yet
in deciding these cases, the judicial composition of the highest
courts in the respective lands is surprisingly similar.
Both courts are divided into "liberal," "conservative" and
"swing" camps. Justices Foster and Handy comprised the liberal
camp of the Newgarth Supreme Court, with Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens playing the same role in the
United States Supreme Court. At the opposite end, the conservative bloc of the Newgarth Supreme Court included Chief Justice Truepenny and Justice Keen, while Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices Scalia and Thomas represent the conservative faction in the Supreme Court. Finally, Justice Tatting and Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor represented the swing votes in the
Newgarth Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court,
respectively. We recognize, of course, that these are rough, imperfect groupings, and that the manner in which we interpret
these terms in 2004 likely is very different from their interpretation in 1949 when Lon Fuller wrote The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers. 133
Moreover, both courts grapple with several common jurisprudential themes. Indeed, strands of all five opinions in The
Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers can be found in the majority
and dissenting opinions in Grutter.
In bridging the span between these two cases, we employ
what we call a "jurisprudence of humility." We argue that this
approach is neither liberal nor conservative, but rather evinces
133. The division of the current Supreme Court into these three camps nevertheless
has much support in the literature. For a few of the many explicit references to Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor as the Court's "swing" Justices, sec Neal Devins, Congress and the
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 773,782 n.39 (2003); Harold
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptiona/ism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1514 (2003); Richard G.
Wilkins & Scott Worthington et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000 Term, 29
HASTI~GS CONST. L.Q. 247,303 (2002); cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 569, 587 (2003) (noting
that the Court "is divided into two camps, in which two Justices (O'Connor and Kennedy)
arc somc:what more weakly attached to the majority than arc the other three members");
Erwin Chcmerinsky, October Term 2002, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 368 (2003) ("[L]awyers
who handle cases before the Court long have felt that they must focus primarily on an audience of one or two, with the outcome likely depending on the votes of Justices Sandra Day
O'Connor and/or Anthony Kennedy"); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous
Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996) (naming
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor as the "most dangerous" Justices of the 1994 and 1995
Terms); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting
the Power Pageam of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131 (2001) (naming Justice Kennedy as
the "most dangerous" Justice of 1994-2000 terms).
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an appreciation that judges and lawyers hold no monopoly on
wisdom and that institutions other than courts may be better positioned in certain situations to resolve a particular issue. A jurisprudence of humility neither freezes the status quo nor casually substitutes judges' views for those of other institutional
players, but instead encourages, in Franklin D. Roosevelt's
words, "bold, persistent experimentation." 134 Indeed, humility in
judging has long been regarded a desired attribute 135 across the
political spectrum. 136 Such humility manifests itself in several
ways, including a recognition that not all dumb statutes are unconstitutional or need to be rewritten by judicial fiat. Indeed,
one marker of a humble judge is that she not infrequently implements laws she neither would have passed (as a member of
the legislative branch) nor would have enforced (as a member of
the executive branch) in the first instance.
Three scholars recently have made eloquent pleas for a
greater recognition of the importance of humility in judging. Michael McConnell states it well in a 1997 article: 13
[A]n essential element of responsible judging is a respect for
the opinions and judgments of others, and a willingness to suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one's
own opinions, especially when they conflict with the decisions

134. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe University (May 23, 1932), in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF fRA:-IKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 639, 646 (Samuel D.
Rosenman ed., 1938).
135. See, e.g., Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY:
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960)
(describing the "spirit of liberty" as "the spirit which is not too sure that it is right"); Felix
Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 905 (1953) ("What is essential in [Supreme Court Justices is] ... first and foremost, humility and an understanding of the range of the problems and of their own inadequacy in dealing with them .... ").
136. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 103435 (1996) ("But one clement that helps to accommodate judicial review and democratic
values is a feeling and attitude-a judge's feeling of humility, an internalized sense that
he is not the sole repository of constitutional truth, an attitude of restraint that is an aspect of temperament."); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1365, 1372 (1997) ("[Tjranslators struggle with a tension that defines the tension confronted by the judge: If translation requires creativity-if there is no such thing as 'mechanical' translation-then some counsel the translator to a kind of humility. Humility
means this: to avoid translations that the translator believes make the text a better text·
to choose instead translations that will carry over a text's llaws as well as its virtues."):
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1749
(1995) ("[Ijncompletely theorized agreements have the advantage, for ordinary lawyers
and judges, of humility and modesty: they allow past judgments to be treated as given
and make it unnecessary to create the law anew in each case.").
137. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humili1y in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of 1he Constitwion, 65 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1269 (1997).
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of others who have, no less than judges, sworn an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. We have heard a lot about
"principle" and "the correct standard" and "integrity." I think
we need to hear more about judicial humility. 138

Judge McConnell concludes that the various constraints on judicial discretion can be understood as means of "tempering judicial arrogance by forcing judges to confront, and take into account, the opinions of others-whether they be the Framers of
the Constitution (text and original understanding), the representatives of the people (the presumption of constitutionality), the
decentralized contributors to longstanding practice (tradition),
or judges in earlier cases (precedent)." 139 Judge McConnell notes
that hard cases occur where these sources are in conflict. In contrast, "where all of these sources of wisdom are united-where
the decision of the representatives of the people is not manifestly
inconsistent with constitutional text, original understanding,
longstanding practice, or governing precedent-it is time for
judges to recognize their own fallibility." 140
The following year, Brett Scharffs 141 accepted Judge McConnell's invitation "to hear more about judicial humility." 142 Professor Scharffs argues that "practical wisdom" is the best model
through which to understand judicial decisionmaking 143 and that
judges, like Anthony Kronman, 144 should embody certain virtues
138. !d. at 1292.
139. !d. Interestingly, Judge McConnell is sharply critical of RONALD DWORKIN,
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), yet Professor
Dworkin closed an earlier work by arguing that his ideal judge with infinite time, resources, and intellect-Judge Hercules-nevertheless should "decide hard cases with
humility." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109 (1975).
140. McConnell, supra note 137, atl293.
141. Brcll Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 127 (1998).
142. McConnell, supra note 137, atl292.
143. Scharffs, supra note 141, at 145-47. For discussions of practical wisdom and
practical reasoning, sec generally Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 MISS. L.J. 225 (1998);
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason:
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); PhilipP. Frickey,

Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposism,"
and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Lynda Ross Meyer, Is
Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism
About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994); David
E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL.
L. REV. 775 (1991).
144. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEAS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION 319-20 (1993).
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of character in exercising practical wisdom. According to Professor Scharffs, Dean Kronman's focus on the virtues of sympathy
and detachment ignores the role that humility can play in mediating conflicts between these virtues, much as humility can bridge
145
the gap between mercy and justice in individual cases. Appropriate judicial humility thus "lies in a mean between undesirable
extremes" 146 -neither underdone (resulting in "pride, arrogance,
or vanity" 147 ) nor overdone (resulting in "worthlessness, subjugation, or servility" 148 ). Professor Scharffs notes that "[a] judge is
more likely to err on the side of having too little humility than too
much." 149 Finally, Professor Scharffs contends that proper humility also will have other salutary effects on the judicial process.
Humble judges respect the sources of authority that constrain and
guide their behavior. They resist revolutionary change and judicial
activism, do not abuse their gower or parties that appear before
them, and have open minds. 1
Most recently, Suzanna Sherry 151 has extolled the virtue of
humility in judging. Professor Sherry observes at the outset that
"[t]he proposition that judges should be humble rather than arrogant hardly needs stating." 152 Professor Sherry acknowledges the
difficulty of mediating the duality between humility and courage,
like the difficulty of mediating other dualities in the law. 153 In the
end, Professor Sherry eschews rules and guidelines in favor of examples from the Supreme Court of excessive humility at one extreme154 and insufficient humility at the other extreme, 155 as well
145. Scharffs, supra note 141, at 145-47.
146. /d. atl59.
147. /d.
148. /d.
149. /d. at 164; see also Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., What Doth the Lord Require of
Thee?, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1403 (1996) ("Most lawyers I know would say that a humble federal judge is an oxymoron; and they arc probably right.")
150. Scharffs, supra note 141, at 186-98.
151. Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2003).
152. /d. at 799.
153. Other dualities include the countermajoritarian dilemma of majority rule versus
minority rights, liberty versus equality, establishment versus free exercise of religion, and
governmental power versus accountability. /d. at 795.
154. /d. at 805-09 (citing as examples Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (declining
to reach merits of constitutional challenge to Connecticut statutory ban on sale or use of
contraceptives, which was declared unconstitutional four years later in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Koramatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (approving constitutionality of internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II); and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (approving constitutionality of curfews
imposed on Japanese-Americans during World War II)). For a discussion of the dangers
of excessive judicial humility spawning passivity, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme
Court's Judicial Passivity, 2!XJ2 SUP. CT. REV. 343.
155. /d. at 800-03 (citing as examples Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding un-
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as instances in which she thinks the Court struck the proper balance.156 Of course, one can (and we do) take issue with the placement of certain decisions along the humility-courage continuum,
but we agree with Professor Sherry that "judges who are inclined
both to doubt themselves and to risk being wrong are more likely
to reach a happy medium than are judges who are too strongly inclined toward arrogance or humility." 157 The jurisprudence of
humility equips us to draw some rather surprising connections between The Case of the Speluncean Explorers 158 and Grutter159 and
to span the gulf in the legal literature between statutory and constitutional interpretation.
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION IN GRUTTER
The surprise is nowhere starker than in an analysis of Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, joined by the four members of
the Court's liberal bloc. Just as Chief Justice Truepenny and Justice Keen in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers felt constrained by their institutional role to defer to the Legislature's
overly broad statute in affirming the defendants' murder convictions, Justice O'Connor deferred to Michigan's thin diversity rationale in sanctioning the use of race in admissions. In so doing,
Justice O'Connor enshrined Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as
the Court's majority position, despite considerable evidence that

constitutional Florida's recount procedures in 2000 Presidential election); Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (upholding constitutionality of separate but equal
racial classifications)).
156. /d. at 804-11 (citing as examples Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2()(XJ)
(refusing to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding unconstitutional
admission of confession obtained without apprising criminal defendant of various constitutional rights)); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992) (refusing to overrule Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitutional various state restrictions on abortion)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery (1976)
(holding unconstitutional federal regulation of wages and hours of employees of state
and local governments)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting constitutional challenge to release of tape recordings of Presidential conversations); Brown v.
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional separate but equal educational facilities); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Goblitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding constitutionality
of requiring students to salute American nag)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding constitutionality of national bank)).
157. !d. at 810.
158. For more detailed commentary on The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, sec
supra note 7.
159. For some of the early commentary on Cruller, sec A JURIST On-Line Symposium: The University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, http://www.jurist.pitt.edu/
forum/symposium-aa.
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the other eight Justices in Bakke rejected Justice Powell's approach.160 In finding that the educational benefits from a diverse
student body constituted a compelling state interest, Justice
O'Connor twisted precedent and unabashedly accepted Michigan's justification for the policy without requiring much supporting social science evidence. In other cases involving racial classifications, the Court has not been so quick to accept justifications
proffered by state officials and has required much more evidentiary support for the classification. 161 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor turned strict scrutiny doctrine on its head by holding
that the enormous flexibility of Michigan's policy is what makes
it narrowly tailored. In examining the Sixth Circuit's similar
holding, Peter Schuck correctly noted that the appeals court
jumped "off the rails" in its "brief analysis of the 'narrowly tailoring' that strict scrutiny demands." 162 Professor Schuck's characterization of the Sixth Circuit's holding applies with equal
force to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion: "Reduced to its
essentials, the majority's position is that diversity means what
Michigan says it means and that any sincere effort by Michi~an
to achieve the critical mass satisfies the narrow tailoring test." 63
Justice O'Connor's decision to sacrifice doctrine to achieve
her desired outcome in Grutter 164 stands in marked contrast to
her role in Lawrence v. Texas, 165 decided three days later. In
Lawrence, Justice O'Connor pointedly did not join the majority
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy (the Court's other swing
160. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Supreme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (1996) ("Of course, the often-criticized 'rule' of
[Bakke] was that universities may usc race ·as a factor' in admissions, but may not create
quotas. While this rule has played a crucial role in American society and American debate, it represented the view of Justice Powell alone. The other eight participating justices explicitly rejected that rule. Ironically, the case stands for a proposition that only
one justice thought sensible.").
161. The most famous illustration, of course, is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954). In Brown, the Court relied in a footnote on various social science studies of
the adverse effect of segregated schools on African-American children. /d. at 494 n.ll.
For different perspectives on the Court's usc of social science evidence in Brown, sec
Kenneth C. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientists' Role, 5
VJLL. L. REV. 224 (1959); Harold B. Gerard, School Desegregation: The Social Science
Role, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 869 (1983); James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003); James E.
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999); Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown
Foolflote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for
Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2002).
162. Peter H. Schuck, Diversity, AM. LAW., July 31,2002, at 75.
163. /d at 76.
164. Cf Nat Hcntoff, What the Supreme Court Left Ow, VILLAGE VOICE, July 22, 2003,
at34 ("Justice Sandra Day O'Connor knew how she wanted [Gntller] to be decided.'').
165. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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Justice) and joined again by the Court's four liberal Justices. The
majority overruled Bowers v. Hardwick 166 and held that a Texas
statute criminalizing sodomy violated the due process rights of
two men engaged in a consensual act of sodomy at home. Justice
O'Connor concurred separately and argued that the statute violated the defendants' equal protection rights because it proscribed homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomr,. Her
reasoning thereby obviated the need to overrule Bowers. 67 Although Justice O'Connor displayed greater fealty to judicial
precedent than the majority, still she refused to give the same
deference to the Texas legislature in Lawrence that she gave to
the University of Michigan in Grutter. Justice Handy's deployment of polling data in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers to
conform the judicial outcome to popular will provides a helpful
window through which to view Justice O'Connor's actions.
In both cases, Justice O'Connor championed the more politically popular result, 168 supported in Lawrence by the reduction in the number of states criminalizing sodomy (from twentyfive states at the time of Bowers to thirteen states today) and in
Grutter by the vast number of amicus briefs from the likes of the
U.S. military and General Motors in support of the diversity rationale.169 But Justice O'Connor missed the chance to accomplish in Grutter what she accomplished in Lawrence: obtaining
the outcome she sought without undermining the Court's legitimacy through dishonest manipulation of well-settled doctrine.
A more "humble" course of action for Justice O'Connor in
Grutter would have been to follow the trail blazed by Justice
Tatting in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers. Conflicted by
166. 47S U.S. 186 (1986).
167. 123 S. Ct. at2884-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
168. For charges that Justice O'Connor often falls victim to the "Greenhouse Effect," se<.: Michael C. Dorf, Fourth Annual Supreme Court Review: October 2002 Term,
PLI LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES NO.
HO-OOJA (2002) ("Conservative jurists appointed by Republican Presidents come to
Washington and, the pundits charge, in an effort to impress such liberal establishment
figures as New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse, lose the courage of their convictions. The charge seems particularly apt in the case of O'Connor and Kennedy."). Thomas Sowell is credited with originating the phrase, which then was popularized by Judge
Laurence Silberman. See Laurence Silberman, Allacking Activism, Judge Names Names,
LEGAL TIMES, June 22, 1992, at 14; see also Max Boot, How Judges Can Make Friends in
Washington, WALL ST.J., July 13,1998, at A15; Martin Tolchin, Press Is Condemned By
a Federal Judge for Court Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at Al3.
169. See Auorneys a1 Law, CNN, June 23, 2003 ("The biggest influence on Justice
O'Connor in that opinion, you could tell, were the briefs from General Motors, from 3M,
from Microsoft, from retired military officers, the establishment saying we embrace affirmative action. That's why she decided the way she did.") (statement of Jeffrey Toobin).
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the arguments on both sides of the bench, Justice Tatting withdrew from the case and, with the Supreme Court of Newgarth
deadlocked at 2-2, the result was to affirm the convictions and
death sentences imposed by the trial court. As a consequence,
the pressure shifted to the other branches of government to provide justice in both the current (through the Chief Executive's
exercise of its power to grant clemency to the defendants) and
future (through the Legislature's exercise of its power to amend
the murder statute) cases.
One would have expected Justice O'Connor to have been
similarly conflicted in Grutter. Yet her majority opinion reflects
no hesitancy on her part in casting the deciding vote in favor of
Michigan's policy. Had Justice O'Connor instead followed Justice Tatting's approach, the Supreme Court would have deadlocked at 4-4 and thus affirmed the decision below by the Sixth
Circuit. 170 This approach is more consistent with a true jurisprudence of humility because it achieves the result Justice
O'Connor sought in Grutter-permitting the use of race in law
school admissions-without contorting the constitution. Such a
split decision would have left the parties, education officials,
federal and state governments, and other political branches to
continue to work toward a colorblind society in which racial
preferences will no longer be necessary.
Indeed, as Cass Sunstein noted in the context of an earlier
affirmative action case, 171 "because the issue of affirmative action is not clearly settled by constitutional history or principle
and is at the center of current political deliberations, the Court
does well to avoid an authoritative judicial ruling. " 172 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter is the "democratic disaster" feared by Professor Sunstein because it "foreclose[s] de170. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en bane). For a recent article applauding the
Court's long-standing practice of affirming the lower court's judgment in cases where the
Court is evenly divided, sec Edward A. Hartnell, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United
States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (2002). Of course, a judge's failure to cast a deciding
vote can he criticized as an abdication of her judicial responsibility, like "the example of
Pontius Pilate, whose washing of hands has, for two thousand years, held central place as
the condemnable paradigm of terminal leave of judgment." Milner S. Ball, THE WORD
AND THE LAW 138 (1993). Professor Ball's reference is to MATTHEW 27:24 ("When Pilate saw that the was getting nowhere, but that instead an uproar was starting, he took
water and washed his hands in front of the crowd. 'I am innocent of this man's blood' he
said. 'It is your responsibility!"'); see also Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY 'L.J.
1719,1768 n.376 (2003) (comparing Pilate's actions with Justice Tatting's "abdication" in
The Case of the Speluncean Explorers).
171. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
172. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (footnote omitted).
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mocratic debate" by enshrining Michigan's nebulous use of diversity.173 In contrast, Justice Tatting's approach would have
been more consistent with Professor Sunstein's ideal:
When a democracy is in moral flux, courts may not be the best
or the final answers. Judicial answers may be wrong. They may
be counterproductive even if they are right. Courts do best by
proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather than preclusive, and
that is closely attuned to the fact that courts are participants in
a system of democratic deliberation. It is both inevitable and
proper that the lasting solutions to the great questions of political morality will come from democratic politics, not the judiciary. But the Court can certainly increase the likelihood that
those solutions will be good ones. Sometimes the best way for
174
the Court to do this is by leaving things undecided.

One difficulty in reinstating the Sixth Circuit's en bane decision to dispose of the case is the serious charge leveled by two of
the dissenting judges that Chief Judge Martin manipulated the
Sixth Circuit's internal processes to obtain the 5-4 decision in favor of the University of Michigan. The dissent alleges that Chief
Judge Martin withheld the en bane petition from the other
members of the court for five months until two conservative
judges took senior status and thus were no longer eligible to vote
on the petition or sit on the en bane panel. The dissent also alleged that Chief Justice Martin inserted himself on the original
panel despite an internal rule requiring the random assignment
of judges to panels. 175
Chief Judge Martin's actions triggered judicial and congressional investigations. In January 2003, Judicial Watch, a public
interest group that monitors government corruption, filed a
complaint of judicial misconduct in the Grutter case (as well as in
a death penalty case) 176 against Chief Judge Martin. Although
the Acting Chief Judge to whom the complaint was referred
found that the two allegations were not disputed, she dismissed
the complaint. Because the Sixth Circuit was in the process of
performing a comprehensive review of its internal procedures, it
reportedly was "taking corrective action regarding all of the issues raised by the complainant." Moreover, the Chief Judge's
term soon would be ending pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

173.
174.
175.
176.

/d. at 93.
/d. at 101.
/d. at 773 (Boggs, J., dissenting); id. at 815 (Batchelder, J., dissenting).
In re Byrd, 269 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2002)
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§ 45(a)(3)(A). 177 Judicial Watch and Chief Judge Martin sepa-

rately appealed to the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit,
which made "no findings of fact concerning the allegations of the
complaint and expresse[ d] no opinion with respect to its content" but concurred in the Acting Chief Judge's finding and
adopted her reasoning. 178
The increased attention that Justice O'Connor's withdrawal
would have brought to the Sixth Circuit's decision would have increased the public's respect for the courts. Fidelity to doctrine and
rigorous self-regulation are hallmarks of a strong, independent judiciary. In an extraordinary debate in the Sixth Circuit, the judges
all agreed that the court's legitimacy depends on the perception
that judges engage in principled decisionmaking but disagreed on
whether the public airing of the procedural irregularities in Grutter enhanced or harmed that legitimacy. Judge Moore took issue
with the dissent's "baseless argument" that "the decisions of this
court are not grounded in principle and reasoned argument, but in
power, and that the judges of this court manipulate and ignore the
rules in order to advance political agendas." 179 We think Judge
Batchelder holds the better view, especially since the subsequent
Sixth Circuit proceedings have borne out the substance of the dissent's complaints of procedural irregularities:
In her separate concurrence, Judge Moore expresses her belief that by revealing (the procedural] history, Judge Baggsand I, by concurring- undermine the legitimacy of the court
and do harm to ourselves, this court and the nation. I believe
that exactly the opposite is true. Public confidence in this
court or any other is premised on the certainty that the court
follows the rules in every case, regardless of the question that
a particular case presents. Unless we expose to public view

177. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. 03-6-372-07 (6th Cir. May 28, 2003).
178. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. 03-6-372-07 (6th Cir. Judicial Council, July 31, 2003); see also Michael!. Krauss, Loading the Dice for the Ruling?, WASH.
TIMES, June 17, 2003, at Al7; Charles Lane, Court Dispute in Affirmative Action Case
Ruled Moot, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2!Xl3, at A2. The House Judiciary Committee also is
investigating Chief Judge Martin's conduct in the Grutter case. See A Judiciary Diminished Is Justice Denied: The Constitution, the Senate, and the Vacancy Crisis in the Federal
Judiciary, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (2002) (statement of Steve Chabot, Chair, Subcomm.
on the Constitution); id. at 41-42 (statement of Kay R. Daly, Coalition for a Fair Judiciary); see also Neil A. Lewis, House Panel to Study Ruling on Law School Admissions,
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at AlO; Adam Liptak, Order Lacking on a Court: U.S. Appellate Judges in Cincinnati Spar in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,2003, at AlO.
179. 288 F. 3d at 753 (Moore, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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our failures to follow the court's established procedures, our
claim to legitimacy is illegitimate. 180

Justice O'Connor concluded her opinion with the prediction-not drawn from any evidence or arguments in the casethat the need for affirmative action in higher education will end
within twenty-five years. 181 In the meantime, it may well be that
the special problem of race in twenty-first century American law
demands extraordinary redress from our legal institutions. Such
redress is better for the country and for the judiciary when it can
be achieved in ways that do not undermine the Court's legitimacy and that foster continued experimentation by the very officials and groups to which Justice O'Connor herself gives such a
wide berth in Grutter. 182
B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS IN GRUTTER

When viewed through the lens of The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, the four dissenting opinions in Grutter, written by the Court's three conservative Justices as well as by Justice Kennedy, reveal a number of fascinating jurisprudential
themes. Some of those themes are not surprising, such as the
strong "textualist" approach to constitutional interpretation
found in all four of the dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia's characteristic use of heightened rhetoric, and Justice Thomas's personal monologue about race. Still other themes catch us by surprise, such as Justice Kennedy's embrace of a "humble"
approach to constitutional interpretation. All of these themes
find their parallels in the mythical Supreme Court of Newgarth.
Perhaps the least surprising point of comparison between
the dissenting opinions in Grutter and the two opinions voting
to affirm the convictions in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is the stated preference for a nonactivist judiciary. This
preference is observed in the real-life conservative Justices'
strong "textualist" and "orifinalist" approach to the reading of
constitutions and statutes, 18 their advocacy for a stricter adher180. /d. at 815 (Batchelder, J ., dissenting).
181. Justice Ginsburg's separate concurring opinion agreed in theory with the usc of
a judicial sunset on racial preferences but refused to adopt a specific timetable. 539 U.S.
345-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
182. For further views on Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence, see Symposium, Justice
O'Connor: Twenty Years of Shaping Constitutional Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 821
(2001); Judith Olans Brown ct al., The Rugged Feminism of Justice O'Connor, 32 IND. L.
REV. 1219 (1999).
183. There arc various shades of originalism reflected in Gruller, ranging from Chief
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ence to precedent, 184 and the view that judges should play a
limited role in the lawmaking process. 185 These themes are most
strongly identified in the opinions of Chief Justice Truepenny
and Justice Keen. For example, Chief Justice Truepenny made
it absolutely clear that regardless of the Court's sympathies, the
Newgarth statute permits no exceptions and that the only
proper outcome is thus to affirm the convictions. 186 Hoping the
Chief Executive would intervene and grant clemency, but unwilling to accomplish the same result indirectly, the Chief Justice evinced a preference for a literal reading of the text and for
a constrained judiciary. Justice Keen adopted an even stricter
stance, refusin~ to consider what the Chief Executive "may or
may not do" 1 and reminding his colleagues that the "sole
question" before the Court is "whether these defendants did,
within the meaning of [the statute], willfully take the life of
[another]." 188 In answering this question, Justice Keen put aside
his "personal predilections" 189 and instead called for a faithful
and honest adherence to the statute.
The preference for a nonactivist court is best illustrated by
the discontent expressed in all four dissenting opinions in Grutter
over the majority's unprincipled and flawed application of the
Court's strict scrutiny standard. For example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist criticized the majority for its lenient application of the
strict scrutiny test, faulting the majority for failing to follow prior
case law and instead giving "unprecedented deference" to the

Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia's "conservative originalism" to Justice Thomas's
"liberal originalism." See SCOTI D. GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999); John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2
GREEN BAG 2D 425 (1999) (reviewing SCOTI D. GERBER, supra); Joel Friedlander, Justice Thomas: An Early Re1rospective, 17 DEL. LAw. 28 (Fall 1999).
184. Although generally associated with conservative judicial philosophies, adherence to stare decisis is not exclusively a conservative doctrine and is not reflexively embraced by conservative judges. See Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 669 (1994) (arguing that in
certain situations it is appropriate for conservative judges not to follow precedent); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Captain lames T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Judicia/Interpretation:
Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty Third Cenwry, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 671, 679-81
(1995) (referring to stare decisis .iS ·'a hoax designed to provide cover for a particular
outcome, not a genuine, principled ground of decision").
185. See David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's
Fidelity to His Constitutionai Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1383 (1999) (describing
the appropriate role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy as one in which
judges follow democratically sanctioned legislative commands).
186. Fuller, supra note 1, at 619.
187. /d. at 632.
188. !d.
189. /d.
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Law School. 190 The Chief Justice's criticism was twofold. First, the
majority improperly redefined strict scrutiny in contrast with prior
cases in which the Court had consistently rejected arguments that
a more lenient application of strict scrutiny should be used in
cases where the defendant has claimed racial classifications were
being used in a benign way, or in cases involving "special" settings
such as educational institutions. 191 Second, the majority's incomplete and faulty analysis of the data before the Court allowed the
Law School to engage in the type of racial balancing that the
Court itself has called "patently unconstitutional." 192 In particular,
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for ignoring the
fact that the percentage of what constitutes a critical mass varied
among the various minority groups and that the correlation between the percentage of the Law School's pool of applicants who
were members of the various minority groups and the percentage
of the admitted applicants who were members of those same
groups was "too precise." 193 In the end, the Chief Justice equated
the Law School's policy to a quota system. 194
Given the stern nature of this criticism, it is curious to hear
the same complaint lodged against Chief Justice Rehnquist regarding a decision he authored less than a month earlier. In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 195 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the majority that Congress has the power
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize suits
against state governments for violating the Family and Medical
Leave Act. 196 The outcome was surprising because in recent cases
the Court has refused to allow lawsuits against nonconsenting
states for violations of a variety of federallaws, 197 and any distinction between those cases and Hibbs is perplexing. 198 Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in Hibbs had the same "flaws" he attributes
to the majority opinion in Grutter. First, by relaxing the showing
190. 539 U.S. 306,379-80 (2003).
191. /d.
192. /d. at 386.
193. /d. at 383.
194. /d. at 386.
195. 538 U.S. 731 (2003).
196. 29 u .S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (200.l).
197. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
(Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimmel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Rclil!ious Freedom Restoration Act).
- 198. See Vikram David A mar, The New "New Federalism": The Supreme Court in
Hibbs (and Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2D 349, 350 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, October
Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices, Not Theory, Determine Constitutional Law, 6
GREEN BAG 2D 367,374 (2003).
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that Congress must make regarding the unconstitutional state
conduct that warrants congressional action to permit lawsuits
against nonconsenting states, the Chief Justice redefined the standard the Court had established in very recent cases. Second, the
Chief Justice engaged in incomplete and faulty analysis of data: in
deciding whether Congress had shown that the states were engaged in unconstitutional conduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist approved Congress's reliance on evidence of sex discrimination in
the development of leave policies by private employers (as opposed to public employers), of discrimination regarding parental
leave (as opposed to family leave), and of discrimination by other
states (as opposed to the state involved in the dispute). This relaxation of the existing doctrine has been criticized for 9iving too
much flexibility to Congress, contrary to clear precedent. 99
At first glance, the Chief Justice's inconsistency in these two
cases smacks of judicial arrogance. Why was he willing to manipulate the established constitutional standard in Hibbs (to allow Congress more flexibility in dealing with gender discrimination in family leave) but not in Grutter (to allow Michigan more
flexibili~ in dealing with affirmative action in law school admissions)?2 A short, often overlooked passage in The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers provides a useful insight.
Justice Handy's opinion was based on two lessons drawn
from personal experience. First, he dismissed the possibility of
executive clemency based on gossip from his wife's niece (a
friend of the Chief Executive's secretary). Second, he compared
the explorers' case to the first case he heard as a trial judge, in
which he was "widely approved by the gress and the public opinion" for employing his common sense. 1 A similar dynamic may
have been at work in Hibbs.
A recent New York Times article questioned the Chief Justice's "solicitude for the usefulness of the FMLA in erasing the per-

199. See Amar, supra note 1lJ8, at 353-54.
200. The decision in Hibbs, although at odds with the Court's most recent federalism
decisions, arguably is consistent with the Chief Justice's broader judicial philosophy. See
Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Jusrice Rehnquisr, Pluralisr Theory, and rhe Inrerprerarion of
Srarwes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 622 (1lJlJ4) (describing the Chid Justice's underlying theory "as a species of pluralism," in which the political system is perceived "as one in which
competing groups seck to advance private interests through bargaining and compromise"); cf Mark V. Tushnct, A Republican Chief Jusrice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328
(llJlJO) ("One could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's bottom-line results by lookmg, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at
the platforms of the Republican Party").
20 I. See Fuller, supra note I, at 643-44.
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vasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is
women's work." 202 The article suggested that this newfound interest
might have something to do with the Chief Justice's family situation: when his daughter experienced child-care problems, the Chief
Justice often "left work early to pick up his granddaughters from
school." 203 Unlike Justice Handy's candid reference to his personal
experiences, the Chief Justice's motivation was not transparent; we
likely will never know whether his firsthand experience with childcare affected his position in Hibbs. If humble judging involves "a
willingness to suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one's own opinions," perhaps we can hope that the Chief
Justice's change of heart in Hibbs indicates a willingness to be a bit
more humble, or at least a bit more human. 204
In addition to his textualist critique in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, Justice Keen also discussed the negative practical implications in future cases of reversing the convictions of
the explorers. Justice Scalia raised similar concerns regarding the
likely effects of the Court's decision in Grutter. He argued that
the majority's subversion of the constitutional strict scrutiny
standard is likeli to generate much future litigation in racial
preference cases. 05
The most interesting connection between Justice Scalia and
the justices of the Newgarth Supreme Court, however, relates
not to substance, but to style. The academic commentary on Justice Scalia focuses almost exclusively on identifying his various
theories of constitutional interpretation, statutory construction,
or deference to administrative agencies. 206 Very little is made of
the style of his judicial writings. Erwin Chemerinsky recently has
202. See Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES,
July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3.
203. !d.
204. See McConnell, supra note 137, at 1292.
205. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348-40 (2lXl3); see Zlotnick, supra note 185,
at 1385 (noting that Justice Scalia has repeatedly warned the Court of the danger to the
Court and the Constitution of letting judges implement their own values).
206. See generally J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice
Scalia's Unwrillen Constitution, 103 W.VA. L. REV. 19 (2000); JayS. Bybee, Printz, The
Unitary Execwive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court's
Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269 (2001); Bradford C. Clark, The Constitlllional Strucwre and the Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 47 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 753 (2003); Autumn Fox &
Stephen R. McAllister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19
CAMPBELL L. REV. 223 (1997); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035
(1991); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis
of Tradition's Role in Constitlllionallnterpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409 (1999); SymposiUm,
Reflecting on Justice Antonin Scalia's Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 1
(2000); Symposium, Justice Antonin Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425 (2003).
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taken Justice Scalia to task for his "frequent sarcasm and
pointed attacks on his colleagues. "207 Among the many examples
cited by Professor Chemerinsky are Justice Scalia's references to
other Justices' opinions as "nothing short of ludicrous," "beyond
absurd," "entirely irrational," "nothing short of preposterous,"
"ridiculous," and "so unsupported in reason and so absurd in
application [as] unlikely to survive. "208 Professor Chemerinsky
argues that such rhetoric "sends exactly the wrong message ...
about what type of discourse is appropriate in a formal legal setting, and how it is acceptable to speak to one another." 209
In Grutter, Justice Scalia does not shy away from his characteristically combative rhetoric. He referred to the Law School's
"critical mass" justification as both "mystical" 210 and "fabled." 211
The critical mass concept, he argued, when used as a justification
for racial preferences "challenges even the most gullible
mind." 212 In yet more sarcastic language, Justice Scalia noted
that the benefit the Law School allegedly derives from diversity-"cross racial understanding"-is not the kind of benefit on
which law students are graded ("Works and Plays Well with
Others: B+") 213 or tested on bar examinations ("Q: Describe in
500 words or less your cross-racial understandings"). 214
Although virtually overlooked, inflamed rhetoric and sarcasm found their way onto the Newgarth Supreme Court. For example, in a passafe whose racial implications have been discussed
by Paul Butler/ 1 Justice Foster referred to the "stupidest housemaid." In arguing that it is proper for judges to "read between the
lines" when interpreting statutes, Justice Foster noted that the
"stupidest housemaid knows that when she is told 'to peel the
soup and skim the potatoes' her mistress does not mean what she
says." 216 Even more pointed Scalia-like language is found in other
opinions. Justice Keen referred to Justice Foster's opinion as "poetic," but full of "fantasy." 217 He argued that Justice Foster used
207. Erwin Chcmcrinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal,
22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385,386 (2000).
208. /d. at 400.
209. /d. at 399.
210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346.
211. /d. at 347.
212. !d.
213. /d.
214. !d.
215. Paul Butler, Stupidest Housemaid, f., Harvard Spcluncean Symposium, supra
note 7, at 1917-23.
216. Fuller, supra note 1, at 625.
217. /d. at 632.
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his purposive approach to statutory construction in so many contexts that, in the event of Justice Foster's incapacity, Justice Keen
"could write a satisfactory opinion for him without any prompting
whatever, beyond being informed whether he likes the effect of
the terms of the statute as applied to the case before him. "218 According to Justice Keen, Justice Foster's approach is unprincipled
and simple-minded because it is both outcome-driven and overly
mechanical. Justice Keen concluded by criticizing "[t]he essential
shabbiness" of Justice Foster's attempt to rewrite the Newgarth
murder statute as incompatible with the proper role that judges
should play in the legal system. 219
Another example of sarcasm in The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers is found in a passage reminiscent of Justice Scalia, in
which Justice Handy criticized the Newgarth Supreme Court for
throwing "an obscuring curtain of legalisms about every issue
presented to them for decision. " 220 After listing some examples
of these "obscuring" legalisms (positive law, law of nature, purpose of the statute), Justice Handy concluded: "My only disappointment was that someone did not raise the question of the legal nature of the bargain struck in the case-whether it was
unilateral or bilateral, and whether [the victim] could not be
considered as having revoked an offer prior to action taken
thereunder. "221
"Streaks of meanness" thus are no strangers to the United
States Supreme Court or to the fictional Supreme Court of Newgarth. Such sarcasm has no place in a jurisprudence of humility,
and inflamed rhetoric can be an indicator of bad judging. The
type of rhetoric used by Justice Scalia and by the fictional Justices Foster and Keen is problematic in at least two ways.
First, such rhetoric is symptomatic of individuals who believe they possess a monopoly on wisdom. 222 Judges with such
views are less willing to engage their brethren in earnest debate
because they feel they have little to learn from others. Judges
who isolate themselves are freer to offend their colleagues with
inflamed rhetoric. 213
218. /d.
219. !d. at 636.
220. /d. at 637.
221. /d.
222. See Sherry, supra note 151, at 805.
223. Sally J. Kenney, Puppeceers or Agencs? Whac Lazarus's CLOSED CHAMBERS
Adds To Our Underscanding of Law Clerks ac che U.S. Supreme Courc, 25 LAW & Soc.
!!'IQUIRY 185, 221 (20<Xl) ("When justices isolate themselves from one another ... it is
harder for the Court to function as an institution").
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Second, a jurisprudence of humility requires a particular
manner of relating to and treating others. Humble judges will
make a concerted effort to avoid humiliating those in their presence by showing both courtesy and respect. 224 This humility
manifests itself as better treatment of parties and their judicial
225
~olleag~es.
Although we. of course do not know the ~ ersonal
mteract10ns among the vanous members of the Court, 2 -6 we do
know that the kind of rhetoric used by Justice Scalia is not conducive to an atmosphere of respect and does not belong in a jurisprudence of humility.
Consistent with his conservative judicial philosophy, 227 Justice Thomas also strongly criticized the majority's opinion in
Grutter on doctrinal grounds. He argued that the Court's precedents clearly indicate that only actions taken by the state "to
provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence" satisfy the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny in matters of
racial classifications 228 and that the Law School's "facile" interest
fails this test. 229 Justice Thomas also criticized the majority's application of the narrow tailoring prong, calling it "conclusory"
and devoid of any "serious effort" to explain the connection between the use of racial classifications and the interest pressed by
the Law School. 230
Following his doctrinal critique, Justice Thomas unleashed
an even sharper "personal" commentary on the stigmatizing effect of affirmative action on members of minority groups who
are presumed to be unworthy of admission to the University of
224.
225.
226.

See Scharffs, mpra note 141, at 195.
/d.

The most detailed depiction of the inner workings of the Court is EDWARD
LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITI"ESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998). For some of the commentary on
CLOSED CHAMBERS, sec THE FORGOTIEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KI"OX: A YEAR IN THE
LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR's WASHII"GTON (David J. Garrow & Dennis
J. Hutchinson, cds., 2002); Erwin Chcmcrinsky, Opening Closed Chambers, 108 YALE
L.J. 1087 (1999); Barry Cushman, Clerking for Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 721 (2(X)3);
David J. Garrow, Dissenting Opinion: A Witness from Inside the Supreme Court is Not
Impressed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at 26; David J. Garrow, "The Lowest Form of
Animal Life"?: Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court History, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
855 (1999); Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835 (1999); Richard W
Painter, Matter of Ethics: Open Chambers?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1430 (1999).
227. For commentary on Justice Thomas's jurisprudence, sec Symposium, Clarence
Thomas After Ten Years: Some Reflections, 10 AM. U. J. GE:\DER, Soc. PoL'Y & L. 327
(2002); Symposium, A Tribute to Justice Clarence Thomas, 12 REGE:\T U. L. REV. 333
(2000); supra note 183.
228. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003).
229. !d. at 355.
230. !d. at 356-57.
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Michigan Law School. Reminiscent of his dissenting opinion in
an earlier school desegregation case, 231 Justice Thomas began his
Grutter dissent with a pointed quote from Frederick Douglass
regarding the treatment of African-Americans by "wellintentioned" whites. 232 This portion of Justice Thomas's opinion
is similar not to the conservative bloc in the Newgarth Court,
which voted to affirm the convictions, but rather to Justice Foster, who voted to reverse the convictions on the basis of his
paean to a liberal judicial philosophy. Justice Foster used his
own view of morality in arguing that when trapped in the cave,
the explorers were outside the laws of Newgarth and effectively
in a "state of nature. " 233 This incursion onto moral ground allowed Justice Foster to argue that judges should first divine and
then apply the legislature's purpose in enacting a statute. 234 Because the explorers were in such an extreme situation, they were
outside the reach of the law, and the Newgarth Court should accordingly have stepped outside the confines of the law as well to
decide their fate.
Like Justice Foster, Justice Thomas looked inward to support his preferred outcome and focused on what appear to be his
own feelings and experiences with affirmative action. Justice
Thomas's personal commentary made the same appeal with respect to race as Justice Foster's exegesis on a "state of nature."
In both cases, the Justices argued that the situation at hand is extreme. Justice Thomas suggested that because race is such a pervasive societal concern, it is of a completely different nature than
other legal problems. Yet while Justice Foster fashioned an extrajudicial remedy in ignoring standard legal doctrine to deal
with the unique problems associated with human cannibalism,
Justice Thomas responded to the special problems of racial preferences by enthusiastically embracing the doctrinal niceties of
strict scrutiny. 235
Although they proposed very different solutions to the "extreme" problems with which they were presented, neither Justice
231. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) ("It never
ceases to amaze me that the courts arc so willing to assume that anything that is predominantly black must be inferior.").
232. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350.
233. See Fuller, supra note 1, at 621.
234. See George Washington Speluncean Symposium, supra note 7, at 1742.
235. Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion is based on the same view of the uniqueness of the race problem. "It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race
bias even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impending realization,of our highest values and ideals." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345.

2004]

AFFIRMATIVE REFRACTION

101

Foster nor Justice Thomas exhibited much humility. By adhering
to his own personal moral views (in the case of Justice Foster) or
to his own personal views on how African-Americans feel stigmatized by the use of affirmative action (in the case of Justice
Thomas), both Justices failed to "doubt themselves and to risk
being wrong. " 236 Both thus showed a streak of arrogance rather
than of humility.
Justice Kennedy's opinion is the most Tatting-like of the
four Grutter dissents. Justice Kennedy argued that the majority's
effective abandonment of strict scrutiny analysis will eliminate
any incentive for government officials at educational institutions
to fashion the race-neutral admissions policies to which all of the
Justices in Grutter purportedly aspired to. In particular, noted
Justice Kennedy, "[b]y deferring to the law school's choice of
minority admissions programs, the courts will lose the talents
and resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new
and fairer ways to ensure individual consideration." 237 University
administrators consequently will have "few incentives" to make
their minority admission programs "transparent and protective
of individual review. " 238
Of greater concern to Justice Kennedy, however, was the effect of the Court's decision on its ability to participate in the continuing development of public policy regarding racial classifications.
By abandoning or manipulating strict scrutiny analysis, the Court
loses authority to approve the use of race and thus diminishes its
role in this important national debate. Justice Kennedy concluded
by noting how the Court's holding affects him as a judge: "If the
Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to approve the use of race in pursuit of student diversity. " 239
Although all of the Justices in The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers purported to be concerned about judicial legitimacy,
Justice Tatting's approach best preserved the Supreme Court of
Newgarth's judicial role in the special circumstances posed by
human cannibalism. A review of the commentary and later opinions on the hypothetical reveals that the decision of whether to
affirm or reverse the convictions was a doctrinally difficult and
normatively contentious issue. For example, the most recent

236.
237.
238.
239.

See Sherry, supra note 151, at810.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393.
!d. al 394.
!d. at395 (emphasis added).
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symposium on The Case of the Speluncean Explorers resulted in
a 3-3 tie vote on whether to affirm the convictions of the explorers.240 Justice Tatting thus faced a "hard" decision. On the one
hand, siding with Justices Foster and Handy to reverse the convictions would have been the popular course of action, but at a
very high cost to legal doctrine (by stretching the scope of the
murder statute) and to the reputation of the court as a principled
institution guided by law and not popular will. On the other
hand, joining Chief Justice Truepenny and Justice Keen to affirm the convictions also would have damaged legal doctrine (by
freezing the reach of the murder statute) and the court's reputation. Justice Tatting's withdrawal got the Court "off the hook."
The Court no longer commanded the floor. Instead, the Chief
Executive, the head of a branch more comfortable in the political arena, took center stage. The Court also avoided manipulating doctrine in the context of a very difficult case, leaving doctrinal changes to future cases of a less polarizing nature and thus
more conducive to extensive and reflective debate.
Yet Justice Tatting's approach was not without cost. The
decision to withdraw meant, as Justice Handy reminded the
Newgarth Court, an affirmance of the death sentence imposed
by the lower court. The failure by Justice Tatting to decide could
on itself be viewed as a failure, having the potential of diminishing the reputation of the institution.
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy's approach in Grutter (and, as
we argue later, in Lawrence) presents the truest jurisprudence of
humility. In Grutter, Justice Kennedy both recognized the importance of diversity and demanded fidelity to the Court's strict
scrutiny doctrine, which would leave the special problems posed
by racial preferences in admissions in the hands of the very officials given such latitude by the majority. This approach is consistent with Justice Kennedy's overall judicial philosophy, recently
described as "a beautiful synthesis of principled legalism and
honest realism." 241 Although he prefers not to create new constitutional principles, Justice Kennedy is willing to adapt old ones
to new contexts. 242 He cares deeply about providing citizens with
"places where diverse 12eople come together to democratically
discuss and deliberate," 243 as well as keeping citizens informed,
240. See Harvard Spelunccan Symposium, supra note 7, at 1842.
241. See Akhil Reed Amar, Juslice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J.
515,520 (1997).
242. !d.
243. !d. at 532.
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in as clear and accessible language as possible, of the important
debates facing the Court and the country? 44
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Grutter and majority opinion in Lawrence reflect a humble, yet courageous, approach to judging. His humility is illustrated in Grutter in two
ways. Justice Kennedy recognized that in the university setting
people from all walks of life "will talk to and learn from each
other face-to-face as democratic equals, " 245 and thus began his
opinion with unquestionable support for diversity in higher education. "Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's acceptance of a university's considered judgment that racial diversity
among students can further its educational task, when supported
by empirical evidence. " 246 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's acceptance
of diversity as a compelling state interest, appears to be the reason why none of the other dissenters joined his opinion. He lamented that the result of the majority's decision will be to lose
"the talents and resources of the faculties and administrators in
devising new and fairer wa.xs to ensure individual consideration"
in the admissions process. 2
Justice Kennedy's humility, however, is infused with courageousness. Although Justice Kennedy is willing to defer to government officials, he was unwilling in Grutter to abdicate his
"constitutional duty to Bive strict scrutiny to the use of race in
university admissions. ,As He thus demonstrated his courage
through his unwillingness to bend doctrine to achieve the politically expedient and popular result. Perhaps Justice Kennedy
now can shed the "Greenhouse Effect" moniker that has dogged
him since his early years on the Court. 249 Similarly, Justice Kennedy in Lawrence refused to manipulate the doctrinal underpinnings of Bowers v. Hardwic/! 50 and instead confronted the de-

244. /d. at 526; see also Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv.
1709, 1801 (1998) (discussing the importance of judges addressing the public at large in
their opinions).
245. See Amar, supra note 241, at 532; Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal,
Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996).
246. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-88 (2(X)3).
247. /d. at 393.
248. !d. at 395.
249. See supra note 133; for articles labeling Justice Kennedy as the Justice most
prone to this malady, sec Boot, supra note 168; Tony Mauro, "Kennedy Court" Ponders
Net Case, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 1997, at 3A ("When conservative federal Judge Laurence Silberman decried the 'Greenhouse Effect' on his colleagues-named for New York
Times court correspondent Linda Greenhouse, a presumed liberal-many think he had
Kennedy in mind").
250. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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mands of stare decisis head on: "Bowers was not correct when it
was decided, and is not correct today." 251
Like Justice Tatting in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, Justice Kennedy cares deeply about both the Court's reputation and the democratic values advanced by the Court's decisions. In Grutter and Lawrence, Justice Kennedy navigates a
course, through both dissenting and majority opinions with a jurisprudence of humilit~ as his compass, which other judicial explorers should follow. 2 2
CONCLUSION
As a tax law professor and a labor law professor using a jurisprudence of humility to help explain the Court's recent landmark affirmative action decision in the context of Lon Fuller's
masterful hypothetical that has challenged and perplexed students and scholars for generations, we complete the task with an
even keener sense of humility than when we undertook this project. But we also believe our effort here draws strength from two
recent strands in legal scholarship.
First, thoughtful books by Richard Fallon253 and Daniel
Farber and Suzanna Sherrf 54 argue that the search for grand
theory does not contribute to our understanding of how actual
judges decide actual cases. 255 For all their intellectual brilliance,
251. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2472, 2484 (2003).
252. Of course, we have not exhausted the possible connections between The Case of
the Speluncean Explorers and Grutter. Indeed, in our Introduction to Law classes in Fall
2003, we asked our incoming first year students to write a paper on which opinions in the
two cases reOectthe best jurisprudential match. The students surprised us with a number
of interesting jurisprudential connections (we did not require the students to read all of
the opinions in Grutter):
Jurisprudential "Matches" in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers and Grutter
University of Cincinnati College of Law Class of 2006
Trucpenny
O'Connor
Rchnquist
Scalia
Thomas

1
4

Keen
2
2
7
29

Foster
20

Handy
11

2
2

2

Tatting
3
4

253.
254.

RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).

255. See also Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand
Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Stallttory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41
(1993) ("Those who develop grand theories of statutory construction, either to explain
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purveyors of such theories are doomed to fail because our courts
"are simply too wildly messy-too beautifully, incongruously
complicated-to be captured in any elegant theory." 256 Instead,
we should focus our attention on the day-to-day role of judges as
"practical lawyers, trying to find workable solutions to institutional, structural, and political difficulties. " 257 We agree with Anthony D'Amato who, in discussing The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, notes that we too often focus on judicial decisionmaking as opposed to a judge's decisionmaking. 258 Instead, "the essence of the lawler's craft is not to learn theories but to persuade judges. " 25 A jurisprudence of humility brings these
"institutional, structural, and political difficulties" into the
sunlight for all to see and, in the process, both constrain judges
in deciding individual cases and guide lawyers in future cases.
Second, William Stuntz makes a plea for greater humility on
the part of law professors because "we know less than we claim
to know, and we are not as smart as we claim to be." 260 He observes that "[o]ur theories may be beautiful things to behold (if
anything published in a law review can fairly be called a thing of
beauty), but they tend to ignore a great deal of messy realityespecially the reality of our own limits. " 261 Professor Stuntz
writes in the context of a Christian perspective on law which we
share. Like Justices Foster and Thomas, whose personal experiences inform their judicial decisionmaking, our Christian faith
informs our work as well. We heed the prophet Micah's advice
to "[DJo justice, and to love kindness and walk humbly with your
God." 62 We believe that a focus on humility has much to offer,
regardless of one's religious faith (if any). We agree with Profes-

the values on which judges actually decide how to construe statutes or to advocate the
values on which judges should construe them, not only confuse technique with theory but
attempt to create values out of mere technique.").
256. Steven D. Smith, Desperately Seeking Serenity, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 523, 526
(2002) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 254).
257. Brian H. Bix, Practical Judging, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 453, 454 (2002) (reviewing FALLON, supra note 253).
258. Anthony D'Amato, The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions, 74 CHI.KENT L. REV. 517, 526 (1999); see also Martineau, supra note 255, at 40 (distinguishing
judicial decisionmaking from decision-justifying).
259. D'Amato, supra note 258, at 526. For further discussion of lawyering as a craft,
sec Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001 ).
260. William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707,1741 (2003)
(reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell &
Robert F. Cochran ct al., cds. 2(Xll)).

261.
. 262.

/d .

MICAH 6:8. See also Scharffs, supra note 141, at 147-57 (discussing the applicallon of th1s passage to the act of judging).
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sor Stuntz that we should approach difficult legal issues with
both caution ("acknowledging that one might not be weighing
costs and benefits ~uite right, there is usually a case to be made
on the other side") 63 and modesty ("paying attention to the possibility that other institutions might be able to contribute more
to solvin~ the problem at hand than could lawyers and
courts"). 2 A jurisprudence of humility, extending beyond the
law professoriate to both judges and lawyers, at least motivates
us to ask the right questions even if we do not agree on the answers. We cannot improve on Professor Stuntz's conclusion:
Humility does not counsel inaction, and it is not a posture of
indifference. Rather, humility always sees the possibility of its
own mistake. That implies not blindness to the errors and injustices that attend the status quo, but awareness that proposed solutions must be tentative, subject to revision as experience dictates .... [It is a ] combination of a strong desire
to do justice with an equally strong sense of the limited vision
of those of us who seek to remold the justice system. And it is
unpredictable- neither clear~ liberal nor clearly conservative
nor inevitably anything else. 2

263.
264.

265.

Stuntz, supra note 260 at 1744.
/d.
/d.

